\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ312.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

21-MAY-14

9:49

CLOSING NEVADA’S COURTHOUSE
DOORS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF DOGRA V. LILES
David H. Rigdon*
Unlike their colleagues on the United States Supreme Court, the seven
justices of the Supreme Court of Nevada rarely produce close (4-3) split decisions. What makes the outcome in Nevada’s Dogra v. Liles even more notable,
however, is that the swing vote, and majority opinion, was provided not by one
of the justices but rather by a Nevada District Court Judge who was temporarily
filling a vacancy created by the recusal of Justice Michael Douglas.1 So, what
issue was at stake to create such a unique split vote? Nothing less than the
rights of Nevada citizens to seek justice in their own court system against outof-state defendants.
Dean Chemerinsky has often remarked on the trend in the federal court
system of interpreting jurisdictional and standing doctrines in an unduly restrictive manner, which effectively closes the doors of the courthouse to the public
and denies litigants access to justice.2 The Dogra decision carries this trend
into the Nevada state court system by using a restrictive interpretation of the
case law surrounding the doctrine of personal jurisdiction to bar Nevada citizens from seeking justice in their home courts.
The fact pattern in Dogra is relatively simple and straightforward. Jane
Liles, a resident of California, purchased a car for her daughter, Susan, to use
while she attended college at Cal Poly University in San Louis Obispo, California.3 The car was registered and insured in Jane’s name; however Susan was
listed as the primary driver on the policy.4 Jane admitted in deposition testimony that she placed no restrictions on Susan’s use of the vehicle.5 On August
22, 2008, while driving on Interstate 15 towards Las Vegas to attend a friend’s
birthday party, Susan lost control of the vehicle causing it to swerve into an
adjoining lane.6 In an attempt to avoid a collision with Susan, the driver in that
* J.D. Candidate, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
1 See Dogra v. Liles, 314 P.3d 952, 954, n.1 (Nev. 2013). Pursuant to article 6, section 4 of
the Constitution of the State of Nevada, in the event of the disqualification of a justice, the
Governor is empowered to appoint a Nevada district court judge to replace him or her. NEV.
CONST. art. 6, § 4.
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: October Term 2010, 14 GREEN BAG
2d 375 (2011). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights
Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 539 (2003); Jim Hellegaard, Closing the Courthouse
Doors, GA. ST. U.C. OF L. (Feb. 15, 2012), http://law.gsu.edu/7602.html.
3 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 6, Dogra v. Liles, 314 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2013) (No. 59381).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 7, 11.
6 Id. at 4.
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lane swerved and instead crashed into the center median.7 The vehicle then
flipped over and landed on top of a vehicle occupied by Melinda and Jagdish
Dogra that had been traveling in the opposite direction.8 Mrs. Dogra was
severely injured as a result of the accident and nearly died.9 She was transported by helicopter to a local trauma center where she remained for almost
two months.10 Her injuries resulted in ongoing cognitive and neurological deficiencies, and she will need continuing medical care for the remainder of her
life.11 As of the date of the appeal, Mrs. Dogra’s direct medical expenses
totaled nearly one million dollars.12
In all, four plaintiffs made claims for damages against the Liles’ insurance
carrier.13 Given that the damages far exceeded the insurance policy limits, the
insurance company initiated an interpleader action in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial
District Court, naming each of the claimants as parties.14 Given that the interplead funds were insufficient to compensate Mrs. Dogra for her injuries, on
August 17, 2010, the Dogras filed a separate complaint against both Susan and
Jane asserting claims of negligence against Susan and negligent entrustment
against Jane.15 Upon receiving service of summons, Jane immediately filed a
special appearance and moved to dismiss the complaint against her for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(2).16 The District Court granted
the motion, finding that the Dogras had failed to provide evidence that Jane
“had ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systemic’ contacts with Nevada.”17 The
Dogras appealed.18
Three issues were briefed and argued in the appeal.19 The first and most
central issue was whether Jane, as a nonresident defendant, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada by virtue of her allowing Susan unrestricted use of
the car.20 The second and third issues were collateral to the first and had to do
with whether Jane waived her right to object to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction when she joined in the motion to consolidate the cases and/or when her
insurance company filed the interpleader action.21 With respect to the first
7

Id. at 4–5.
Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Respondent’s Answering Brief at 1, Dogra v. Liles, 314 P.3d 952 (Nev. 2013) (No.
59381).
14 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 5.
15 Id. at 2.
16 Id.
17 Respondent’s Answering Brief, supra note 13, at 2.
18 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 3. When the other claimants also brought suit
against both Jane and Susan, the Liles subsequently filed a motion to consolidate all four
cases arising from the accident. Respondent’s Answering Brief, supra note 13, at 2. At the
time of the motion only Susan was still a party to the Dogra’s lawsuit. See id. However,
since both she and Jane were named parties in the suits filed by the other claimants, they
filed the motion to consolidate jointly. Id. The motion was subsequently granted. Id. at 3.
19 Dogra, 314 P.3d at 955.
20 Id. at 954–955.
21 Id. at 954.
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question, the majority opinion held that “a nonresident defendant is not subject
to personal jurisdiction in Nevada when the sole basis asserted is his or her
adult child’s unilateral act of driving the defendant’s vehicle in Nevada.”22 The
court also found, in deciding the second issue, that the filing of the consolidation motion did not act as a waiver of Jane’s right to assert a jurisdictional
defense since it did not “implicate the parties’ substantive legal rights”.23
Finally, with regards to the third issue, the Court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether, when the insurance company filed the interpleader, it was acting as Jane’s agent, thereby waiving her jurisdictional
defense.24 It is the first of these three holdings that raises the most concern in
terms of closing access to Nevada courts and, thus, this Note will focus exclusively on that issue.
Nevada’s long-arm statute provides that a Nevada court’s jurisdiction over
non-residents extends to the limits allowed by the U.S. Constitution.25 The
seminal case of International Shoe v. Washington firmly established that to
satisfy the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a court must determine
whether a nonresident defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum jurisdiction such that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”26 Applying this test in Budget Rent-A-Car v.
Eighth Judicial District Court, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that, where a
rental agreement specifically provided that the renter could not drive a vehicle
outside of California without Budget’s written permission, and where such permission was neither sought or granted, a Nevada court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Budget.27 The question raised in Dogra, by contrast, is
whether Jane’s unrestricted grant of use of her car to Susan provided sufficient
minimum contact with Nevada to establish personal jurisdiction.
In answering this question the Court looked for guidance to two cases
from other jurisdictions: Tavoularis v. Womer, 462 A.2d 110 (N.H. 1983), and
Stevenson v. Brosdal, 813 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).28 In Tavoularis, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a New Hampshire court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was proper where
the defendant “specifically authorized” a friend to use his vehicle in New
Hampshire.29 Likewise, in Stevenson, a Florida appeals court held that a nonresident defendant established sufficient minimum contacts with Florida when
he loaned his son a car with specific knowledge that the son would regularly
use the car there.30 The primary difference between the majority and minority
opinions in Dogra was in how broadly these decisions were construed.
22

Id.
Id.
24 Id.
25 NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (2013).
26 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065,
supra note 25 (providing for jurisdiction to the limits of what is allowed by the U.S.
Constitution).
27 Budget Rent-A-Car v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 835 P.2d 17, 20 (Nev. 1992).
28 Dogra, 314 P.3d at 956.
29 Tavoularis v. Womer, 462 A.2d 110, 114 (N.H. 1983).
30 Stevenson v. Brosdal, 813 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
23
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The majority opted for a restrictive approach, interpreting Tavoularis and
Stevenson as placing the burden on a plaintiff to prove either (1) that a nonresident defendant gave specific authorization to use their car in the forum state, or
(2) that they had specific knowledge of the driver’s use of the vehicle in that
state.31 Referring to World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286
(1980), Judge Flanagan reasoned that interpreting Jane’s no-restrictions policy
as specifically authorizing Susan’s use of the car in Nevada would, in effect,
appoint the vehicle as Jane’s agent for service of process.32 In his view, such an
interpretation “would be unreasonable and would offend due process.” Since
Susan’s driving of the car in Nevada was a “unilateral act unsanctioned by Jane
and of which Jane had no specific knowledge,” the majority held that Nevada
has no personal jurisdiction over Jane.33
Justice Gibbons’ dissent, joined by Justices Cherry and Saitta, favored a
broader reading of the Tavoularis and Stevenson decisions. The dissent reasoned that Jane implicitly consented to Susan’s use of car in Nevada when she
failed to impose any restrictions on it.34 They noted that in her deposition Jane
did not deny actual knowledge of her daughter’s trip to Las Vegas (a trip that
had been planned for five months), but instead stated that she could not remember whether she knew about it or not.35 Since, in deciding a motion to dismiss,
every inference is to be made in favor of the non-moving party, the dissent
reasoned that Jane’s knowledge of the trip should be inferred.36 Furthermore,
Justice Gibbons pointed out that it was entirely foreseeable that Susan, a college student in southern California, would potentially drive the car to Las
Vegas absent explicit instructions to the contrary.37 Therefore, considering the
close proximity of Las Vegas to southern California, the factual inference that
must be drawn regarding Jane’s knowledge of the trip, and Jane’s failure to
explicitly prohibit Susan from driving to Nevada, the dissent determined that
Jane could reasonably expect to find herself becoming a defendant in Nevada
for an accident arising from Susan’s use of the car.38
While Jane may yet find herself subjected to Nevada’s jurisdiction based
on her insurance company’s filing of the interpleader action, the central jurisdictional holding of Dogra raises significant concerns regarding access to justice. As Dean Chemerinsky has noted, even if decisions of this type simply
reflect the pro-business leanings of conservative jurists, they fail to “recognize
that civil suits for monetary damages . . . are essential to ensure that injured
individuals gain recovery and that future misconduct is deterred.”39 A denial of
access to the courthouse often results in a denial of justice to injured parties. In
Dogra, the majority’s decision to narrowly circumscribe jurisdictional rules
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

See Dogra, 314 P.3d at 956.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960 (Gibbons, J. dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 389–90.
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means that Nevada citizens, injured by the actions of out-of-state defendants,
can be denied access to the very courthouses supported by their tax dollars. It is
a result that was both unnecessary and unjust.

